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In the U.S. and globally, the recovery is going well, but …
European sovereign debt: Second major crisis in 21 months.
Responses to the crisis are necessary, but are also harming 
the credibility earned through stable, rules-based policy.
Credibility can take a long time to rebuild.
Regulatory reform in the U.S. is likely to become law, but 
cannot fully resolve problems.
A new, more volatile era seems to be at hand.
The challenges for monetary policy will be manifold.The recovery is on track ...  GDP expected to reach 2008:Q2 peak before year-end
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U.K.…but the EU Crisis May Be a New ShockDebt and deficits





















Source: Bloomberg.The role of government guarantees
Financial market contagion is a concern. 
One positive is that bank guarantees remain in place—the 
upside of “too big too fail.”
Governments have made it very clear that they do not think 
they can allow the failure of very large financial firms at this 
juncture.
In 2007 and earlier, “too big to fail” guarantees were not as 
explicit as they are today, and so markets were more likely to 
run on large institutions with significant exposure to problem 
assets.Credibility WaningSuccessful medium-term policy
A large part of successful macroeconomic policy is clear 
delineation of how the government will act in various states 
of the world.
During the financial panic of 2008 and 2009, and again 
today, governments have been forced to take unprecedented 
actions.
While these policy moves were necessary, they have also 
eroded credibility.
We know that credibility is often established only over a long 
period of time.Re-establishing credibility?
One key problem going forward will be how to re-establish 
credibility for macroeconomic policy.
Policymakers tried to gain credibility for policies that turned 
out to be unrealistic:
 In the U.S., ambiguity over “too big to fail.”
 In Europe, ambiguity over the necessity of meeting debt and 
deficit targets.
Credible policies are more effective, but may not be possible 
in the near term.
Medium-term policy choice will have to take this into 
account.Regulatory Reform in the U.S.The scope of regulatory reform
The financial crisis affected firms across industries in both 
the U.S. and Europe.
These firms operated in a variety of regulatory environments.
They often owned different lines of business.
Very few escaped unscathed, suggesting that a change in 
regulation is not a panacea.
One key common denominator: exposure to securitized 










Type of Firm  
(2007: Q4)
Citigroup Inc. $2,187 10.9% 10.9% BHC
Bank of America Corp. 1,715 8.5 19.5 BHC
JPM Chase & Co. 1,562 7.8 27.3 BHC
Goldman Sachs Grp. 1,119 5.5 32.9 Inv. Bank
AIG 1,060 5.3 38.2 Insurance
Morgan Stanley 1,045 5.2 43.4 Inv. Bank
Merrill Lynch 1,020 5.1 48.5 Inv. Bank
Fannie Mae 882 4.4 53.9 GSE
FHL Mortg. 794 3.9 56.9 GSE











Lehman Bros. 691 3.4 64.2 Inv. Bank
Wells Fargo 575 2.8 67.1 BHC
MetLife Inc. 558 2.7 69.9 Insurance
Prudential Financial 485 2.4 72.3 Fin. Adv./Ins.
Hartford Financial Svcs. 360 1.8 74.1 Insurance
Washington Mutual 327 1.6 75.7 Thrift
U.S. Bancorp 237 1.1 76.9 BHC
Countrywide Financial Corp. 211 1.0 78.0 Thrift
Bank of NY Mellon Corp. 197 0.9 79.0 BHC
Lincoln National 191 0.9 79.9 Insurance
Large S&P 500 Financial Firms (As of 2007:Q4)The who’s who of the crisis in the U.S.
About 1/3 of the financial assets in the table are in bank 
holding companies as the crisis started.
The less-regulated shadow banking sector played a huge role.
New regulations need to take a view of the entire financial 
landscape—otherwise many activities are forced into less 
regulated entities.
Pending legislation does not appear to be sufficiently broad in 
concept to address this concern.New forms of panic
The hallmark of the crisis: Runs on non-bank financial firms.
We know how to address bank runs: Deposit insurance plus 
prudential regulation.
There is no analog for runs on non-bank financial firms.
Additional capital requirements do not solve this problem.
I expect the problem of runs on non-bank financial firms to 
be with us for the foreseeable future.
One possible reform: Change the tax code to discourage 
short-term debt finance.A More Volatile Era?A more volatile era?
Credibility is an important part of successful macroeconomic 
policy.
The policy actions of the past two years, even while 
necessary, have eroded credibility.
There are clear limits to what U.S. regulatory reform is likely 
to accomplish.
Important problems will remain unresolved by the legislation.
I expect less credible macroeconomic policies and lingering 
unresolved issues to combine to create a more volatile 














U.KThe near-zero rate policy
The policy to keep rates near zero for an extended period can 
influence real activity at the zero lower bound according to 
modern monetary theories, such as Woodford (2003).
The effects depend on the credibility of the promise.
The policy carries risks that are not part of the standard 
analysis:
 Markets may confuse the policy with the “interest rate peg” 
policy, in which rates do not adjust in response to shocks.
 This is one of the worst policies according to the literature.
 In particular, multiple equilibria or “bubbles” are possible.Federal Reserve balance sheet
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Traditional Portfolio and Long-Term Assets
Billions $The quantitative easing policy
The near-zero interest rate policy has been supplemented 
with an aggressive quantitative easing policy.
This program is generally regarded as effective.
To the extent the QE policy has been successful, the more 
cumbersome “extended period” policy is called into question.
The inflationary impact of the QE policy depends on the 
perceptions of how and when the policy will be removed.
In theory, any credible commitment to remove the policy in 
finite time will work well.
In practice, markets may well lose faith sooner than that.Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
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